Legal pluralism is the existence of several legal systems within a (human) population and/or geographical area. Plural legal systems are particularly common in former colonies, where the law of a former colonial authority may coexist with more traditional legal systems (customary law). Regulation is not an official monopoly; There are several areas of normative entrepreneurship, innovation and interpretation. State law does not rule over an unregulated landscape, but over a dense tangle of rivals and companions. Its impact depends on how it interacts with the different native species around it; Central official institutions themselves are the scene of persistent and pervasive local variations. These different deviations from unity and uniformity were examined under the headings of private administration, indigenous law, semi-autonomous social spheres and local legal culture. Pluralism is very important to us: the centralist vision of a monolithic integrated legal system turns out not to be a description of modern law, but part of its ideology. In today`s world, corporations typically have more than one legal system. Legal pluralism refers to situations of legal coexistence in a single social sphere. Originally described in colonial situations in which the colonial power placed a European legal system above an existing indigenous system, legal pluralism is now understood as a fundamental feature of all legal systems. Advanced capitalist states, as well as colonial and postcolonial states, have several legal systems.
Some are rooted in semi-autonomous social spheres that are self-regulating, but are also subject to the regulation of society as a whole, such as commercial networks (Moore 1978) or criminal communities. Many institutions, such as schools and businesses, are developing forms of private administration. Informal but rule-based relationships are characteristic of families, communities and voluntary organizations, although there is considerable debate as to whether such forms of normative order should be called law. Globalization increases legal pluralism in two ways. First, it promotes the circulation of legal forms and practices from one nation-State to another. Constitutions, codes and legal institutions are often transplanted, as in the earlier period of colonialism. These transplants introduce codes and procedures different from those of the host society, often with the aim of reforming them. Colonial transplants have been characteristically formulated as promoting civilization; mid-twentieth century transplants as modernizing institutions; and those of the late twentieth century as a promotion of democracy and the rule of law. Institutional recognition of a customary or religious legal system has occurred when the institutions of that system have been incorporated into a State legal system, for example when chiefs have become administrative officials or judges of the State. This often occurred in the British colonies, in accordance with the policy of indirect government, which sought to govern the colonies by indigenous forms of government. With the abandonment of politics from the 1940s onwards, this recognition lost its importance, but it continued in a limited form.
In other colonies, it was adopted as a concession to local opinion as well as for practical reasons; It has continued there since independence. Legal pluralism is an important factor in understanding what people argue about, how disputes arise in social life, what decisions are made about how they treat them, how they move forward, what ultimately happens to them, and how the resolution of a particular dispute affects how other people deal with similar problems. At all stages of (potentially) “legal” litigation, the existence of non-“legal” norms, procedures and institutions profoundly influences what happens. Based on the general literature on litigation or litigation (see n.a A number of scholars have paid particular attention to the plural normative context in which disputes often occur. Exemplary studies include Ellickson (1991) on neighbourhood conflict in rural California; Todd 1978, on conflicts over relationships and social status in a Bavarian village; Santos (1977) on informal law and disputes in a Brazilian squatter neighborhood; and Abel (1979) on the introduction of Western courts into the non-Western environment of British Africa. Of particular interest was the way in which judicial institutions adapt to the decisions of their clients. In particular, K. von Benda-Beckmann (1984) successfully applied the legal anthropology method of “extended procedure” and showed how forum shopping litigants apply different state and non-state laws at different stages of a dispute, so that the enforcement of a judicial judgment, for example, can be regulated in practice by non-state norms. Galanter (1981) and Griffiths (1983) attempted to integrate the perspective of legal pluralism into the general formulations of process theory. An important source of legal pluralism has been the anthropological analysis of the coincidence of Aboriginal and colonial laws (Rouland 1988). But even in modern societies where the legal system has spread and become dominant, there are many other types of social control and regulation in addition to the legal system of the state. This is particularly true of the formal and informal disciplinary procedures currently conducted in industrial and bureaucratic organizations (Henry 1983, Arthurs 1985).
The sources of Islamic law are the Qur`an, Sunnah and Ijmah, but most modern Western nation-states derive the basis of their legal system from the Christian superpowers of ancient times (Britain, France, etc.). This is also the reason why the moral laws found in the Bible have in fact been laws in their own right, with the original basic standard going far back in legal history and thus fulfilling the priority of positivists and naturalists. Hamed Kazemzadeh, orientalist, believes that despite the flattening of many current differences under the influence of science, technology and increasing communication in legal pluralism, we cannot imagine a significant reduction in differences in our fundamental value systems, whether philosophical or cultural, in the near future.  Anthropologists have also observed that some societies function without government, but still have social order and rights-like institutions. In modern nations, there may be different societies, so it becomes appropriate to speak of legal pluralism. The classification of legal systems then depends on the characteristics of different societies or their subgroups. Leopold Pospís̆il (1974, pp. 106-26), for example, describes this situation as a structured mosaic of subgroups belonging to certain identifiable types with different affiliations.